The purpose of this study is to examine the ability of debt ratios in predicting company performance and stock returns in the long run. The U.K. companies included in the FTSE-350 index for the past ten years constitute our sample. We rank the companies according to the degree of leverage that they have. Then we examine the predictive ability of the debt burden for shareholder wealth by investigating the cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold returns in the long-run for a holding period of three years. The results show that companies with moderately low leverage yield buy and hold abnormal returns of up to 20% in three years.
Introduction
The quest for out-performance is the Holy Grail of investment strategy. Whether a particular approach will out-perform can never be stated with certainty. However, the benefit of hindsight, allows us to discover investment strategies that would have outperformed in the past. Until now various strategies based on momentum (for example, Lakonishok et al.,1994, De Bondt and Thaler, 1995) , Price Earnings ratio (Campbell and Schiller, 1988) , size (Banz, 1981, Chan and Chen, 1991) , book-to-market (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok, 1991, Fama and French, 1992; 1996) and various others have been put forward. Most of these have been successful in explaining, as well as forecasting, stock returns for their data sets.
Theoretically, it is known that leverage is one of the basic sources of risk. The Miller and Modigliani (1958) proposition 1 states that, in a world of complete and perfect capital markets with symmetric and full information amongst all market participants, the financing decision is irrelevant in determining value. The value of the levered firm is no different from the value of the unlevered one. Proposition 2 (1963) states that, with frictions and imperfections such as corporate taxes, the expected return on equity is positively and linearly related to leverage because the risk to equity holders increases with leverage and hence there is no optimal capital structure. Miller (1977) argues that recognising personal taxes in addition to corporate taxes will diminish and potentially eliminate the advantage of debt to a firm's value. Myers (1984) was concerned that, despite the foregoing discussion, actual financing levels adopted by companies remained unexplained.
In almost every textbook in Finance there is a chapter on financing decisions and the dividend controversy explaining an optimal capital structure that maximises shareholder wealth. Most managers seem to believe that such an optimum position exists and take decisions accordingly. Indeed, Hull (1999) finds that new issues of debt when a company's leverage is below an industry norm adds value, whilst issues when the leverage is above the norm diminishes value.
The question we address here is whether share price performance can be predicted from, or can be explained by, leverage or gearing ratios calculated from the published annual reports of quoted companies. There may be an optimal debt ratio that maximises the firm value. The optimal debt ratio should be the leverage which the investor prefers most, i.e. the debt ratio that would yield the maximum possible return for a reasonable holding period, factoring in the risks associated with debt finance. In undertaking this analysis we also provide evidence for the existence of optimal capital structure in the UK for larger non-financial companies.
The rationale for borrowing money rather than retaining profits or issuing more shares is a complex one. For some companies options may be limited due to low profits, covenants attached to existing loans and a disappointed stock market. For others there may be the seeking of a perceived "optimal" leverage ratio or the desire to gear-up the shareholder return by buying back shares and replacing the cash by raising debt. The use of long or short-term borrowing may have different motives and give different messages to the shareholders. Indeed, the subject of debt or equity is more diverse than a two-way choice. The use of capital instruments that have some of the properties of debt and equity, such as preference shares, can cause confusion over the true level of debt and therefore leverage.
Not only is the decision concerning capital structure a complex one, but the assessment of the capital structure by an outsider is a further problem. The quality of financial reporting of the company is dependent on the accounting standards and practices of the country of domicile and the quality of audit. Many authorities have moved to curb the use of off-balance sheet finance, that is the absence of reported debt whilst a company faces the burden of debt. Off-balance sheet financing implies the systematic understatement of leverage ratios. The curbing of off-balance sheet finance highlights a further problem, that of changing accounting rules and regulations. The meaning of changes in leverage ratios over time is somewhat diminished by changes in the accounting policies used and therefore, most likely, the relative level of shareholder investment recognised in the balance sheet.
A country's history of economic development also has implications for the use of debt. In some nations debt is seen as a, if not the, key method of raising finance. In others it is used more sparingly. In countries where the banks own a reasonable proportion of the shares and also lend money to companies, the distinction between debt and equity may be somewhat blurred. A loan holder who is also a shareholder is unlikely to foreclose when interest is not paid on time and awareness of this dual holding would alter shareholders' interpretation of the risk that would be associated with different levels of leverage. The differing national addiction levels to debt are shown in Bernard and Healey (1996) show the US to have similar gearing levels to Germany and that Japan has a very wide spread of leverage levels. From the above it is reasonable to assume that investor sentiment for leverage may be a function of the country where the company is based and of the differing company law implications for debt and equity holders. Indeed, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000) find that the characteristics of debt change with stock market liberalisation. It may also change over time and with differing points in the economic cycle, with high leverage more likely to be a portent of financial distress as recession approaches.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the predictability of UK stock returns by using debt ratios. The debt ratio, as a measurement of financing decisions, is an ignored variable in much of the literature. The capital structure decision and its information content are normally investigated by examining dividend announcements (Asquith and Mullins, 1983) and equity issues (Asquith and Mullins, 1986 ). As we have explained above there are measurement problems as well as theoretical disputes in using debt ratios to predict firm value, i.e. stock returns. However, debt ratios provide a direct measurement of capital structure.
Here we investigate the level of leverage of large UK companies, each with a minimum of ten years quotation on the London Stock Exchange. The focus in this paper is on capital gearing, using a debt to total financing ratio. We examine the profitability of a trading strategy based on investing in portfolios chosen by gearing ratios. This also gives an idea of the most preferred gearing ratio for larger companies in the UK.
Data and methodology
The sample represents a total of 170 companies from the UK and covers the period from 01.01.1990 through 01.05.1999. Data comes from Datastream. In forming the final sample, we started with the 350 companies listed at the FTSE-350 index, this is a weighted index of the largest 350 domestic companies on the exchange when ranked by market capitalisation. We firstly excluded companies with short quotation experience, some 100 companies. Then we excluded the 58 financial companies remaining, since we are investigating the predictive power of leverage ratios, and these ratios have different interpretations for, banks, security houses, leasing companies, etc. The 22 companies that had changed the fiscal period end date during the decade were also excluded from the sample due to the difference that a longer or shorter fiscal year might cause in the interpretation of leverage ratios.
In the UK, the twelve month fiscal years may end at any point in the calendar. Most companies choose the end of a month or a date close to a month end. Half of the companies (50%) in our sample had a Balance Sheet date of December 31 st . Others had Balance Sheet dates spread throughout the year. The only requirement for each firm-year observation in order to enter the sample was the availability of a fiscal yearend leverage ratio and stock price series for that company. Generally, annual reports are announced and published about four months after the end of the fiscal period, and each year in the sample was started on May 1, when half the companies had just released information. The resulting sample contains a total of 1860 firm year-end observations.
We use the Capital Gearing Ratio (Data-stream code: 731) to represent the leverage of the companies in the sample. It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as:
Gearing Ratio = Preference Shares + Subordinated Debt + Total Loans + Short-term Loans (1)
Total Capital Employed +Short-term Debt + Intangible Assets + Future Tax Liabilities
Stock returns for each company are calculated on a daily basis and defined as the log difference of consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. Unlike similar studies that employ monthly returns we use daily returns.
The higher frequency of stock return data is more realistic in terms of the calculation of abnormal returns and buy-and hold returns. We take each year to be the calendar year with 757 to 760 working days for the three year holding period, depending upon which year the portfolio was constructed. For the overall portfolio, 757 days are used for the three-year holding period.
We present our evidence at the portfolio level. Portfolio assignments are made annually based on the debt ratio of the firm. Firms are ranked according to the gearing ratios that are available from annual reports with year-end dates of December 31 st, or before, every year. To make sure that we avoid look-ahead biases, the annual assignments into deciles are made according to the available information as of May 1 st of the following year when all the annual reports may be assumed to be published.
Return compounding ends 757 days after. We define R it as the return for firm i for day t. Daily returns are continuously compounded by taking the log differences of two consecutive prices. R mt is the market return on day t, calculated as the log differences of index levels of FTSE-350 for two consecutive days. We calculate the market adjusted abnormal returns for day t as:
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated cumulating across the 736 days:
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated as follows. To test the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns are equal to zero for a sample of n firms we employ the following two parametric test statistics as described in Barber and Lyon (1997):
Where CAR it and BHAR it are the sample averages and σ(CAR it ) and σ(BHAR it ) are the cross sectional sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. Both statistics follow a Student's t-distribution under the null hypothesis.
Findings
In table 2, summary statistics about the sample distribution of gearing ratios are presented for the years 1990-1995. These are the six years we use for portfolio formation based on gearing ratios. Then abnormal returns are calculated for the following three years. Decile 1 has the firms with the lowest debt ratios and Decile 10 has the firms with the highest debt ratios. For the overall sample, the mean gearing ratio for Decile 1 is 3.4% and for Decile 10 is 93% with standard deviations of 2.7% and 48.5% respectively. Note that for the firms with the highest leverage, the standard deviation is extremely high indicating that Decile 10 contains highly dispersed observations. Also, from Table 1 we observe that for Decile 1 and Decile 2 the average gearing ratio has increased from 3% and 11% respectively to 15% and 19%
respectively towards the end of the research period. During the portfolio formation period the average leverage employed by the firms that have the smallest debt ratios in the sample have increased more than five times. ****insert table 2 here**** Table 3 presents the results first in a year by year basis then for the sample period as a single portfolio. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) are reported for a three year holding period together with related t-statistics. respectively, if the one invested in the second third deciles. The buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of these portfolios were 41%, 31%, 12% and 36%
respectively. The average debt ratios of these portfolios were 17% to 20%. During 1994 and 1995 average debt ratios increased in all deciles. For portfolios constructed in these years it would be possible to earn excess returns (CAR) up to 15% and 17%
and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of 10% and 15% respectively if one invested in the highest debt ratio portfolios. The average debt ratio of these portfolios would be approximately 75%.
A careful inspection of figure 1 suggests that the excess returns on the lower debt portfolios, that is deciles one, two and three, have been earned around the anniversary dates of the portfolios. Around days 250, 500 and 750 we observe that excess returns increase significantly. These dates correspond to May each year, i.e. after the announcement of annual financial statements. This finding may indicate that lower debt firms come up with unexpectedly good financial results in the years that follow the portfolio construction.
The results for the overall sample reveal similar results. If an investor were to invest in the first decile and had an average debt burden of 3.4% he would be able to earn a cumulative abnormal return of 13.7% in three years time. The CARs for average debt burdens of 12.3% and 19.1% are 9.7% and 12.8% respectively during the three year holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns are negative for deciles (4) through (9).
The maximum debt portfolio that bears an average debt ratio of 93% yields a 5.5%
CAR for the three year period. It should not be anticipated that the decile scores should sum to zero for abnormal returns as the investments here are not weighted for size of company.
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) reveal a similar picture. During the research period, for the minimum debt decile whereby the average debt ratio was 3.4%, the buy-and-hold returns for three years turned out to be 20.1%. For the next two deciles with debt burdens of 12.3 and 19.1%, the buy-and-hold returns were 12.4 and 18.5% respectively. The maximum debt portfolios that bear 53% and 93% average debt ratios yield 4% and 6.5% buy-and-hold abnormal returns respectively in the long-run. Figure 2 , presents the long-term returns from portfolios with different debt ratios. Here we can visually observe that the moderately lower debt ratios yield the best abnormal returns in the long run.
*****insert figure 2*****
Conclusions
This study finds that over the period 1990 to 1999, debt ratios could have been used to predict share price out-performance in the UK. Companies in deciles with low leverage showed significantly higher returns than the market. Hence the building of portfolios following such criteria would have outperformed the market. Besides we note that the outperformance is observed mainly around the time of the announcement of further financial results.
Our findings suggest that both firms and investors should consider low leverage ratios as an attractive feature. Firms, in their capital structure decisions, should consider that low debt ratios might increase investor sentiment and future shareholder wealth.
Investors could form portfolios based on low leverage considering the predictive ability of debt ratios on excess returns in the long run.
The work also highlights the issue of optimal capital structure as share price performance is related to the level of leverage. The study suggests that for many companies in the UK such a financing structure would include a relatively low level of debt. One alternative explanation would be that low geared firms have the greatest potential for increasing leverage and it is this opportunity that is being valued. This view is supported by the fact that leverage in low and moderate debt companies rises Ratios, 1990 Ratios, -1995 This table reports the means, medians and standard deviations of the Gearing Ratios for the sample. The sample of 170 firms are assigned into deciles considering their Gearing ratios during 1990-1995. Portfolios are made accordingly to represent low versus high leverage firms. Decile 1 represents the firms with the lowest gearing ratio and Decile 10 represents the firms with the highest gearing ratios. The second column gives the number of firms in each decile for each portfolio formation year and the overall sample. The gearing ratio is from the Datastream (Data-stream code: 731) and represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. It is defined as the ratio of (Preference Shares + Subordinated Debt + Total Loans + Short-term Loans) to (Total Capital Employed +Short-term Debt + Intangible Assets + Future Tax Liabilities) as given in equation 1 in the text. For the overall sample (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) deciles are defined as they were defined for each year and then firms in each decile at different years are used to form a single portfolio of that decile for the whole sample period. Ratios during 1990 Ratios during -1995 . The gearing ratio is from the Data-stream (Data-stream code: 731) and represents the total debt to total financing of the firm Portfolios are made accordingly to represent low versus high leverage firms. Decile 1 represents the firms with the lowest gearing ratio and Decile 10 represents the firms with the highest gearing ratios. The second column reports the number of firms in each decile. The third column reports the number of days for the three year holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated as described in equations 2 and 3 in the text with related test statistics T CAR = CAR it / (s(CAR it )/n 1/2 ) and T BHAR = BHAR it / (s(BHAR it )/n 1/2 ) respectively. CAR it and BHAR it are the sample averages and s(CAR it ) and s(BHAR it ) are the cross sectional sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. Both statistics follow a Student's t-distribution under the null hypothesis. For the overall sample (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) deciles are defined as they were defined for each year and then firms in each decile at different years are used to form a single portfolio of that decile for the whole sample period. 
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